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Abstract:  
Gains from trade come from a certain degree of specialisation among trade partners. 
Specialisation in the case of an agriculture-based developing country might be feared 
to imply a higher reliance than ever on low skill labour. Trade might thus be seen as a 
step away from the much awaited structural transformation of the economy, which 
can only come with increases in agricultural productivity. In this paper, we suggest 
that it needs not be the case. We show that trade openness can in fact trigger the 
structural transformation of such an agrarian society. It can induce a higher reliance 
on human capital accumulation and produce the necessary productivity gains for an 
economy to pick up. Our dynamic general equilibrium model provides a clear 
illustration of the mechanics behind such structural transformation. 
 
 
Keywords: Trade openness, skill-supply, agricultural extension services, general 
equilibrium 
 
JEL Classification: F16 ,  J21 ,  J22 ,  O11,  O24 
 
1 Introduction
Many developing countries depend heavily on agricultural commodities for export earn-
ings, particularly those from Sub-Saharan Africa (UNCTAD 2003). From the view-point
of traditional trade theory, gains from trade come from specialisation in goods for which a
country has a comparative advantage. This should spell optimism, not pessimism, among
development’s planners. Yet for agriculture-based developing countries, public discussions
of specialisation point to the negative impact the dependence on agricultural exports has
on their development process (UNCTAD 2003). Excessive price fluctuations associated with
primary agricultural products have been exposed as impediments to gains from specialisa-
tion for these countries. For example, UNCTAD estimates that in 1999-2002 coffee producers
would have earned US$ 19 billion more, sugar producers US$ 1.4 billion more and cotton
producers US$ 1 billion more, had world’s prices stayed at the average 1998 level.
Notwithstanding the above, the main issue facing agriculture-based countries, as a group,
has been to decide what to negotiate for in multilateral trade talks. Should trade negotiations
with manufacturing-based countries focus on new international policies to reduce vulnera-
bility to negative commodity price shocks – thereby preserving specialisation as a feature of
North-South trade? Or, should they focus instead on increased diversification of their ex-
ports base to include manufacturing products? For the second of these options – which often
requires temporary protection –, the case is that diversification is viewed as essential to the
process of economic development of agriculture-based countries. This however comes with
the proviso that temporary protection necessary to launch the new industries can become
permanent (Matsuyama, 1990), due to government failure (Krueger, 1996). What is more,
whatever a country diversifies into, there is the likelihood of other countries doing the same
(UNCTAD 2003). This rush toward diversification may result in depressed world prices,
thereby lowering gains from trade. Hence the specialisation-diversification dilemma facing
agriculture-based developing countries. It is important that this dilemma be resolved so as
to clarify the issues these countries should focus on in multilateral trade negotiations. Can
specialisation be a driving force of economic development in an agriculture-based country?
In other words, in absence of excessive price fluctuations, can reliance on agricultural com-
modities as a source of export earnings enhance the development process of such a country?
These questions are crucial to consider because today’s developing countries farmers,
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more than their predecessors, are under increased pressure to make judicious choices re-
garding crop selection, inputs use, quality control, pre- and post-harvest technologies. Re-
sponding to such pressure in a way that leads to on-farm productivity growth requires the
provision of support services needed to guide their decisions (The World Bank 1997). Hence
the importance of agricultural extension services.1
As a services provision sector, agricultural research and extension relies intensively on
skilled labour – agronomists and agricultural technicians – for the design and transfer of or-
ganisational methods, new crop varieties, management systems, production and marketing
technologies. The development of the research and extension services sector is therefore of
prime importance for agriculture-based developing countries. Yet, in these countries, short-
age of skill supply seriously limit the availability of quality extension service to farmers,
which in turn limits on-farm productivity growth. To the extent that structural transforma-
tion involves sustained growth in the relative proportion of skilled labour, can trade-induced
specialisation in agriculture enhance the development process of agrarian economies?
In this paper, we formalise this idea using a three-sector inter-temporal general equilib-
rium model. For the small agriculture-based economy we consider, trade openness has three
direct effects. First, it lowers the relative price of the import-competing good, and pools
both physical capital and skilled labour out of the import-competing sector. The skilled
labour thus released may be absorbed by the research and extension service sector, while
the released physical capital moves into the farming sector, as a complementary input to
agricultural extension services. Second, it unleashes a process of capital-augmenting tech-
nical change that reduces the importance of unskilled labour relative to physical capital in
farming. This causes farmers to substitute capital for unskilled labour as the demand for
agricultural extension services rises. Third, trade-induced specialisation causes the return
to skill investment to rise, thus leading to an increase in the supply of skilled labour in the
long-run.
The ability of agricultural research and extension services to generate aggregate produc-
tivity gains is by no means a purely theoretical idea. It has been shown that these services
are responsible for a substantial share of TFP growth in India over the last three decades
1Agricultural extension encompasses a range of services aimed at expanding farmers’ exposure to effective
organisation and management skills, and to new technologies. It focuses on helping farmers master techniques
and socioeconomic knowledge necessary to the improvement of the productivity of their farms.
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(Evenson et al., 1999).
2 Selective literature review
Sustained growth in per capita income involves a structural transformation of the economy,
an important feature of which is the change in the skill composition of the labour force.
For initially skill-scarce countries, static trade models predict that trade Liberalisation will
cause a fall in the return to skill. This prediction raises the question of whether, in the
long-run, and for an initially skill-scarce country, trade openness will cause this scarcity to
persist. Efforts to address this question have essentially pitted two strands of the theoretical
literature on trade openness and skill-supply dynamics. Contributions in the first strand
include works by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), Matsuyama (1992), and Stokey (1996).
These authors argue that trade openness for an initially skill-scarce country will cause the
scarcity of skills to persist in the long run. By contrast, the second strand of this literature,
including contributions by Cartiglia (1997), Eichers (1999), and Ranjan (2001) overturn this
prediction.
A common point in the second strand of this theoretical literature is the emphasis on the
link between the costs of skill accumulation (including payments of education fees) and the
skilled labour wage. Since it takes skilled individuals to impart skills, a rise in the skilled
labour wage has an adverse effect on skill-investment in the presence of credit constraints,
because it raises education costs. These authors argue that trade openness for an initially
skill-scarce country can correct this adverse credit-constraint effect, by inducing a fall in
the skilled labour wage. This fall, in turn, by causing education costs to fall, leads to an
increase in the proportion of individuals who invest in education. The result, they argue, is
an increase in the supply of skilled labour in the long-run. However, since trade also induces
a contraction of the import-competing sector, which is intensive in skilled-labour use, this
prediction implies that the long-run increase in the supply of skilled labour will fail to benefit
the export sector, which, by contrast, is intensive in unskilled labour. Indeed, trade-openness
in these models seems to lead to growth in the education sector at the expense of the rest
of the economy (namely the import-competing sector and the export sector): teachers are
hired just to train future teachers. In our model, the increase in the supply of skilled labour
benefits the export sector in two ways. First, it leads to greater use of extension services
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in farming. Second, the increase in the supply of extension services brought about by the
increase in the skilled labour supply triggers a process of agricultural transformation whereby
physical capital substitutes for unskilled labour in farming.
Furthermore, models in that second strand of literature appear to be at odds with existing
empirical evidence regarding the link between trade openness and the skill-premium, because
they imply a decrease is the skill-premium (understood as the ratio of the skilled labour
wage over the unskilled labour wage). Yet for many trade-liberalising developing countries
(including Brazil), available evidence reveals rising skilled labour supplies accompanied by
non-declining skill-premia (Robbins 1996; Arbache, Dickerson and Green, 2004).2
Unlike this literature, we obtain a positive association between trade openness and skill
supply that is consistent with this empirical evidence. Our model retains some features of the
second group of trade and factor accumulation models, except for four main features. First,
unlike Cartiglia (1997), Eichers (1999) and Ranjan (2001), our non-traded sector produces
an input for the export (not the import-substituting) sector. Second, education costs are
unrelated to the domestic skilled labour wage. In fact, in our model, education only has
an opportunity cost, which is composed in part by the foregone unskilled labour wage from
investing in education. Third, capital and unskilled labour are perfect substitutes in farming
(the export sector), which creates a basis for a process of agricultural transformation. Fourth,
the availability of agricultural extension services increases the importance of physical capital
relative to unskilled labour in farm production. These four features highlight our main
contribution to this literature.
Clearly, our paper is also linked to the growth literature in which substantial ground has
been gained on the understanding of structural transformations (see, e.g. Laitner, 2000) and
the potential role of human capital (see, e.g. Temple and Voth, 1998).
3 Model
We build a small, overlapping-generations, three-sector economy in which economic activities
extend over an infinite number of periods. It operates in discrete time t. There are two final
goods: a commercial crop (good a) which we take as the numeraire, and an import-competing
2Other related contributions include Acemoglu (2002, 2003), and Desjounqueres, Machin and Van Reenen
(1999).
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good (good m). Both final goods are tradable. In addition, there is an intermediate good
(good x), which is used as an input into the production of good a. This intermediate good is
non-tradable. We interpret the nontradable good sector as the research and extension services
sector, which provides technology-based solutions for relaxing on-farm yield constraints. The
output of this sector is simply referred to as agricultural extension services.
At the beginning of every period, a new generation of two period-lived heterogeneous
agents is born. In every period, a generation of old agents coexists with a generation of
young agents. There is no population growth, and each generation has total population size
normalised at unity. In their first period of life, all agents must decide whether to invest
in skill accumulation or to supply unskilled labour to firms from that period on. In their
second and last period, agents supply labour to firms in exchange for a wage, ωi, depending
on their skill status i (i = s if skilled, i = u if unskilled).
Young agents are each endowed with a level of physical capital, k, which they rent out to
firms in the beginning of the first period, at a market price r. They differ in their respective
endowments of physical capital, and are distributed across physical capital levels according
to a cumulative function, Ψ, with strictly positive p.d.f., ψ, over the bounded support,
[
k, k¯
]
,
0 ≤ k < k¯ <∞. The difference in physical capital endowment is the only source of inequality
in this environment. Capital fully depreciates within a period.
Let e be a binary variable taking value 1 if a young individual decides to invest in skill
accumulation, and 0 if he elects to supply unskilled labour to firms. A young agent who
chooses e = 0, supplements his capital income with an unskilled labour income in the first
period, and remains an unskilled worker throughout his entire lifetime. In contrast, an agent
who elects for e = 1 will forgo income from unskilled labour in the first period, in order to
receive a skill-enhancing education, and so becomes a skilled worker in his second and last
period of life. There is no education fee: all education costs are pure opportunity costs.
Let yτt (e, k) denote the income at time t of an agent of age τ ∈ {1, 2} having made
decision e when his endowment of capital was k:
yτt (e, k) =


rtk + (1− e)ωut for τ = 1
eωst + (1− e)ωut for τ = 2
Let pj denote the relative price of good j (j = m, x). In each period, a typical individual
divides his income between consumption of good a (denoted as Ca) and of good m (denoted
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as Cm). The lifetime utility of an agent born in period t is given by:
U(c1t, c2t+1) = ln c1t + β ln c2t+1 (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1] denotes a time-discounting factor, and cτt = (Caτt)
µ (Cmτt)
1−µ, µ ∈ (0, 1).
Agents choose their occupational strategy (e) by anticipating the consequences this choice
will have on their lifetime utility which in turn depends on how much they consume in every
period. By backward induction, forward-looking agents first determine their optimal lifetime
utility given their occupational choice, then select the occupational option that yields the
highest lifetime utility.
An agent’s periodic budget constraint is given by Caτt + Cmτt ≤ yτt (e, k). Given the
above specification of the utility function, in each period demand is Cobb-Douglas:
Caτt = µyτt (e, k) (2)
Cmτt = (1− µ)
yτt (e, k)
pm
. (3)
The above demand schedules will prove useful for characterising skilled and unskilled labour
supplies.
3.1 Agents’ occupational choices
At any date t, the supply of skilled labour is given by the total proportion, ηst, of skilled
individuals. This figure equals the total proportion of adult agents who chose to invest in
skill acquisition when young. Since all young agents are forward-looking, in choosing their
occupation, they balance the discounted future benefits against present education costs.
Let V (e, k,Mt) denote the indirect lifetime utility of a young agent who makes occupa-
tional choice, e, in the first period, when he is endowed with a level of physical capital, k,
and the state of the world is given by the vector Mt = (rt, ωut, ωst+1, ωut+1, pm). From (1),
substituting in (2) and (3), yields
V (e, k,Mt) = ln [rtk + (1− e)ωut] + β ln [eωst+1 + (1− e)ωut+1]
− (1 + β) (1− µ) ln pm + Z, (4)
where Z denotes a residual term. Thus, a young agent will choose to invest in skill-enhancing
education if his endowment, k, of physical capital satisfies:
V (1, k,Mt) ≥ V (0, k,Mt) ,
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and will choose to take employment as an unskilled worker otherwise.
Let ϑ (k, θt, pit+1) = V (1, k,Mt) − V (0, k,Mt) represent the net value gain an agent
derives from investing in skill in the first period, when he is endowed with a level of physical
capital k, and faces an opportunity cost of education, θt = ωut/rt and a future skill-premium
pit+1 = ωst+1/ωut+1. Using (4), it can be established that:
ϑ (k, θt, pit+1) = ln
[
k
k + θt
]
+ β ln pit+1. (5)
Clearly, the net value gain from investing in skill rises with the agent’s physical capital
endowment, k, or with the future level of the skill-premium, pit+1, ceteris paribus. In contrast,
this net value gain from skill investment decreases with a rise in the opportunity cost of this
investment.
Since ϑ is increasing in k, young agents who benefit from investing in skill acquisition are
necessarily those endowed with a level of physical capital higher than a threshold, k∗t , which
solves equation ϑ (k, θt, pit+1) = 0. Using (5), we therefore obtain k
∗
t as follows:
k∗t =
θt
(pit+1)
β − 1
. (6)
To simplify the analysis and guarantee existence of closed form solutions, assume without
loss of generality that β = 1. The threshold is then simply: k∗t = θt/ (pit+1 − 1). This
expression calls for two remarks. First, in absence of any positive skill premium (if ωst+1 =
ωut+1), there does not exist a level of endowment such that education is worthwhile (k
∗ →∞).
Second, as the skill premium pit+1 becomes large, then k
∗
t
∼= θt/pit+1, i.e. the threshold
endowment of physical capital is approximately the inverse of a measure of the return to
education. Let Rt denote this return:
Rt =
pit+1
θt
(7)
The threshold endowment of physical capital is thus approximately:
k∗t
∼=
1
Rt
, all t. (8)
Since this relation is very easy to interpret and since it is reasonable to think that pi is large
in developing countries in which skills are in short supply, we will use this approximation
henceforth.
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As Ψ (k∗t )
∼= Ψ (1/Rt), the total number, nt, of young agents who will become skilled
individuals in their second period of life is given by:
nt ∼= 1− Ψ (1/Rt) , (9)
all t = 0, 1, ... Given the properties of the function, Ψ, it follows from (8) that any exogenous
factor that raises the return to education, Rt, tends to cause an increase in the proportion,
nt, of young agents who choose to forgo unskilled-labour income in order to invest in skill-
enhancing education:
∂nt
∂Rt
> 0.
However, in a general equilibrium, the return to education, Rt, will also adjust to changes
in nt, and we must take this into consideration when analysing the effects of trade openness
in this initially skill-scarce, agriculture-based economy.
Recall that given our normalisation of the population size of this economy, in period t,
the total supply of skilled labour is given by the proportion of agents who chose to invest
in skill-accumulation in period t − 1. In contrast, the total supply of unskilled labour in
period t, is composed of two different generations of agents: old agents who did not invest
in skill-accumulation in period t− 1 (in total number 1− nt−1), and young agents who elect
to work from period t on (in total number 1 − nt). Therefore, letting ηit denote the total
supply of labour of quality i (i = s, u) in period t, it follows that
ηst = nt−1 (10)
ηut = 2− nt − nt−1, (11)
t = 0, 1, .....
Structural transformation in this economy therefore is captured by the law of motion for
ηit as determined by the law of motion of nt. To characterise these laws of motion, we now
explicitly model the supply side of the economy.
3.2 Production and factor prices
In this subsection, we describe the production technologies for all goods produced in this
economy. For convenience we temporarily drop the time subscript, except when absolutely
necessary.
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A. Production of the import-competing good
Production of the import-competing good requires physical (Km) and skilled labour (Sm).
Output in this sector is described by a constant-return-to-scale technology:
Ym = (Km)
α (Sm)
1−α , α ∈ (0, 1)
Profit-maximisation by perfectly competitive firms leads to the following factor demand
schedules:
ωsm = (1− α) pm
(
Km
Sm
)α
(12)
rm = αpm
(
Km
Sm
)α−1
. (13)
B. The research and extension services sector
This sector produces extension services, using skilled labour only.3 Workers in this sector are
agronomists and/or agricultural technicians. They do research and technically assist farmers
in raising on-farm productivity. The representative firm’s output, Yx, thus is given by:
Yx = (Sx)
1−α . (14)
Profit maximisation in this non-tradable sector leads to:
ωsx = (1− α) px (Sx)
−α , (15)
where px denotes the relative price of extension services. Assuming skills are perfectly
transferable across sectors, resource constraint in the skilled labour market is given by:
Sm + Sx ≤ ηs.
C. The farming sector
3In our model, agricultural extension services are assumed to be privately provided. In areas dominated
by commercial farming, private sector involvement in the provision of extension services seems to be a natural
mechanism for addressing farmers’ services needs in ever-changing agro-ecological environments (World Bank,
1997). With the increased commercialisation of agriculture in many developing countries, it seems therefore
appropriate to assume a private provision of extension services. In practice, many developing countries, often
with the help of The World Bank, have created competitive private-sector network of extension consultants
to deliver inputs and technology to private farmers (Schultz et al., 1996). Umali-Deininger (1996) also
documents the involvement of private consulting firms in the provision of extension services in countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Korea, and Taiwan.
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Extension services have been an important input for agricultural development in most de-
veloping countries (Evenson and Mwabu, 1998; Evenson, Pray and Rosegrant, 1999; Owens
et al. 2003), along with capital, land and labour. To keep the focus on the importance of
extension services, we abstract away from land as an input into farming. Farming essentially
requires the use of agricultural extension services X, physical capital, Ka, and unskilled
labour, U . For the functional form of the production technology in farming, we draw from
Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and from Krusell et al. (2000). In particular, physical capi-
tal and unskilled labour are perfect substitutes and have unit elasticity of substitution with
agricultural extension services (input X):
Ya = X
1−α
[
φ
(
X¯
)
Ka + U
]α
, (16)
where X¯ denotes the total supply of extension services, and φ
(
X¯
)
denotes the positive effect
the availability of agricultural extension services has on the productivity of the physical
capital input. For simplicity, we set
φ
(
X¯
)
= X¯ε, 0 < ε < 1 (17)
Equation (16) implies that input X is complementary to the composite input φ
(
X¯
)
Ka +U .
In equilibrium, demand equals supply: X = X¯.
Since good X is non-tradable, domestic market-clearing implies that
X = Yx. (18)
Under perfect competition, profit-maximisation leads to the following factor demand sched-
ules:
px = (1− α)
[
φ (X)Ka + U
X
]α
(19)
ωu = α
[
φ (X)Ka + U
X
]α−1
, (20)
ra = αφ (X)
[
φ (X)Ka + U
X
]α−1
. (21)
Resource constraint in the physical capital market is given by:
Ka +Km ≤ K,
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where
K =
∫ 1
0
kdk
denotes the aggregate stock of physical capital.
Since φ′ > 0, (20) and (21) imply that growth in the stock of agricultural extension
services will increase the marginal productivity of both physical capital and unskilled labour,
but the magnitude of this increase is higher for physical capital than for unskilled labour,
thus setting up a process of capital-augmenting technical change in agriculture.
4 Equilibrium effects
In this section, we examine the effects of trade openness on the structure of the labour force,
and their implication for the development of the extension services sector. In what follows
we define an equilibrium in the context of a small open economy.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium) An inter-temporal general equilibrium for this initially skill-
scarce, agricultural, open economy is a sequence of prices, {p∗xt, r
∗
at, r
∗
mt, ω
∗
ut, ω
∗
sxt, ω
∗
smt}
∞
t=0,
a sequence of threshold physical capital endowments, {k∗t }
∞
t=0, a sequence of school-goers,
{n∗t}
∞
t=0, a sequence of intersectoral allocation of inputs, {K
∗
at, K
∗
mt, S
∗
xt, S
∗
mt, U
∗
t , X
∗
t }
∞
t=0, a
sequence of returns to education {R∗t }
∞
t=0, and a sequence of relative supply of skilled and
unskilled labour {η∗st, η
∗
ut}
∞
t=0, such that, for all t:
(i) given
(
pm, p
∗
xt, η
∗
st, η
∗
ut, η
∗
st+1, η
∗
ut+1, ω
∗
sxt, ω
∗
smt, ω
∗
ut, K
)
, X∗t = (S
∗
xt)
1−α, S∗xt satisfies (15),
S∗mt satisfies (12), K
∗
at satisfies (21), K
∗
mt satisfies (13), and U
∗
t satisfies (20);
(ii) ω∗sxt = ω
∗
smt = ω
∗
st and r
∗
at = r
∗
mt = r
∗
t ;
(iii) given (K∗at, U
∗
t , X
∗
t ), p
∗
xt satisfies (19);
(iv) given
(
pm, pxt, η
∗
st, η
∗
ut, η
∗
st+1, η
∗
ut+1, K
)
, R∗t satisfies (7);
(v) given k∗t , n
∗
t satisfies
nt = 1−Ψ (k
∗
t ) . (22)
(vi) given
(
pm, η
∗
st, η
∗
ut, η
∗
st+1, η
∗
ut+1, K
)
, k∗t satisfies (8);
(vii) η∗st and η
∗
ut , satisfy
η∗st = n
∗
t−1
η∗ut = 2− n
∗
t − n
∗
t−1;
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(viii) all markets clear.
In a model like ours, the picture of the general equilibrium effects of trade openness
can be quite blurry. To clarify this picture, we restrict attention to long-term effects by
emphasising the economy’s behaviour along the steady state.
Definition 2 (Steady State Equilibrium) A steady state equilibrium is a general equilib-
rium, which in addition satisfies n∗t = n
∗
t−1 = n
∗, for all t, where n∗ denotes the steady-state
proportion of individuals who invest in skill.
Combining the definition of a steady state equilibrium, with conditions (iv) and (vi) of
a general equilibrium, it follows that
n∗ = 1−Ψ (k∗t ) (23)
which implies that k∗t = k
∗ along the steady state. This in turn, implies that the return to
education, R∗t , is constant along the steady state: R
∗
t = R
∗.
4.1 The determinants of the steady state return to education
In this subsection, we characterise the equilibrium return to education as defined in (7)
along the economy’s steady state. Under the assumption of intersectoral capital mobility,
capital market clearing implies that the rental rate of capital will be equalised across sectors:
ra = rm = r. Since there is also intersectoral mobility of skilled labour, skilled-labour market
clearing implies that ωsx = ωsm = ωs.
Lemma 1. The demand for skilled labour in the non-tradable sector is given by
Sx = A¯ (pm)
−δ , (24)
where δ = 1/α (1− α) (1− ε) and
A¯ = (1− α)(1−α)δ . (25)
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Proof. See appendix
Since δ > 0, Lemma 1 implies that, a rise (a decline) in the relative price of the import-
competing good causes the demand for skilled labour in the intermediate-good sector to
decline (rise):
dSx
dpm
< 0.
This is quite intuitive as both the import-competing sector and the extension services sector
have a competing claim on the supply of skilled labour. Our next step is to characterise the
steady-state return to education, R∗.
First, from the definition of the opportunity cost, substituting in (20) and (21), yields
the steady-state opportunity cost of education as follows:
θ∗ =
1
φ (X)
Combining (17) with the extension services production function using market-clearing con-
ditions and substituting in (24) yields:
θ∗ =
(
A¯
)
−(1−α)ε
(pm)
δ¯ , (26)
where δ¯ = δε (1− α). Then, observe that for a small economy with initially a comparative
advantage in the production of the agricultural good, trade openness (i.e., a decline in pm)
lowers the opportunity cost of education:
∂θ∗
∂pm
> 0.
This is because trade openness triggers a process of technological progress that raises the
importance of physical capital relative to unskilled labour in farming. Observe from (26)
that growth in the economy-wide stock of physical capital has no effect on the opportunity
cost of education. This result is a direct consequence of the assumption that physical capital
and unskilled labour are perfect substitutes in farming.
We next turn to the characterisation of the skill-premium. Recall that the skill-premium
in wage is defined as the ratio of the skilled-labour wage over the unskilled-labour wage. As
such, it measures the relative earnings of skilled workers. We can therefore characterise the
steady-state skill-premium through the following lemma:
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Lemma 2. The steady-state skill-premium is given by
pi∗ =
λ
n∗
[
(pm)
−δ¯ K + (1− n∗) ν
]
, (27)
where
λ =
(1− α)
α
A¯(1−α)ε,
ν = 2/A¯(1−α)ε.
Proof. See appendix
For a small economy with initially a comparative advantage in the production of the
agricultural good, the partial equilibrium effects of trade openness (i.e., a decline in pm) on
the skill-premium are unambiguously positive:
∂pi∗
∂pm
< 0,
since δ¯ > 0. In contrast, an exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labour, n∗, tends to
reduce this skill-premium:
∂pi∗
∂n∗
< 0.
Furthermore, since
∂pi∗
∂K
> 0,
growth in the stock of physical capital will increase the skill-premium. This result follows
from the assumption of perfect substitutability between physical capital and unskilled labour.
Growth in the economy-wide stock of physical capital, by decreasing the cost of physical
capital, induces the substitution of physical capital for unskilled labour in farming, thus
causing the wage for unskilled labour to decline. Because growth in the demand for physical
capital in farming raises the marginal productivity of agricultural extension services, demand
for extension services will rise as a result of capital inflow in farming, thus leading to an
increase in the skilled labour wage, as supply adjusts to demand. Hence the increase in the
skill-premium.
From the definition of the return to education, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that the
steady-state return to education is given by:
R∗ =
[
(pm)
−δ¯ K + (1− n∗) ν
]
(pm)
−δ¯ (n∗)−1 λ¯, (28)
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where λ¯ = λA¯(1−α)ε. The partial equilibrium effects of trade openness on the return to
education are straightforward. As can be seen from (28), the steady-state return to education
tends to rise with trade openness (i.e., a decline in pm):
∂R∗
∂pm
< 0,
and with a rise in the economy’s stock of physical capital, K :
∂R∗
∂K
> 0.
This implies that growth in the economy-wide stock of physical capital will increase the
return to education, because it increases the skill-premium, without causing a decline in the
opportunity cost of education. However, the return to education tends to decrease with an
exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labour:
∂R∗
∂n∗
< 0.
Therefore since n∗ will adjust to changes in pm, it follows that the general equilibrium effects
of trade openness on the return to education are the sum of two different effects: a direct
effect (i.e., ∂R∗/∂pm) and an indirect effect ([∂R
∗/∂n∗] ∂n∗/∂pm).
4.2 Trade openness and skill accumulation
In this subsection, we focus on the long-term effects of trade openness on the supply of
skilled labour for a small economy with initially a comparative advantage in the production
of the agricultural good. Since the analysis is carried in the steady state, we first establish
the existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium.
From condition (23), substituting in (28) yields the following condition for the existence
of a steady-state equilibrium:
n = f (n, pm, K) (29)
where
f (n, pm, K) = 1−Ψ

 λ¯−1 (pm)δ¯ n[
(pm)
−δ¯ K + (1− n) ν
]

 .
Observe that (29) is a well-defined fixed-point problem, owing to the properties of the func-
tion f .
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A number of observations can be made from condition (29). First, since the domain of
the function Ψ is bounded below by k ≥ 0, then Ψ (0) = 0, so that f (0, pm, K) = 1. This
implies that there does not exist a steady-state equilibrium with no skilled labour. In other
words, any steady state equilibrium of this economy satisfies n∗ > 0.
Second, to the extent that the lowest individual endowment of physical capital satisfies
k <
λ¯−1 (pm)
2δ¯
K
, (30)
clearly, f (1, pm, K) < 1, implying that an equilibrium with no unskilled labour does not
exist either. In other words, any equilibrium of this economy satisfies 0 < n∗ < 1.
Third, since the function Ψ is strictly increasing, clearly, by construction, f is strictly
decreasing in n and pm. In contrast, f is strictly increasing in the economy-wide stock of
physical capital, K. Hence Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem may be applied to establish the
existence of a steady state equilibrium:
Proposition 3 Suppose k satisfies condition (30). Then, there exists a unique n∗ ∈ (0, 1),
such that n∗ = f (n∗, pm, K), and
(i)
∂n∗
∂pm
< 0
(ii)
∂n∗
∂K
> 0.
Properties (i) and (ii) of proposition 1 follow from a direct application of the Implicit
function theorem. Property (i) states that in the long run, trade openness raises the supply
of skilled labour in an initially skill-scarce agriculture-based country. This is because trade
openness in such an economy, triggers a process of technical progress that increases the
importance of physical capital use relative to unskilled labour use in farming. When this
happens, the return to education rises, thus raising the number, n∗, of individuals who
benefit from investing in skill-enhancing education. Crucial for this result is the assumption
that physical capital and unskilled labour are perfect substitutes as farming inputs, while
both are complementary to the extension services input.
Property (ii) states that an inflow of physical capital in the economy will increase the
supply of skilled labour in the long run. There are two underlying reasons for this result.
First, because of the substitutability between physical capital and unskilled labour in agri-
culture, an increase in the supply of physical capital causes a proportional decrease in the
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marginal productivity of each of the two inputs, thus leaving unchanged the opportunity cost
of skill-investment. Second, because physical capital and agricultural extension services are
complementary, a higher supply of physical capital increases the productivity of extension
services, thus leading to an increase in the market demand for these services. Since extension
services sector is intensive in skilled labour, in the long run, the rise in the demand for these
services will increase the demand for skills, thus increasing the skill premium. Property (ii)
is also consistent with the physical capital and skilled labour complementarity hypothesis
prevalent in the literature on factor returns and accumulation (e.g., Krusell et al. 2000,
Greenwood and Seshadri 2002).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the forces underlying the structural transformation of a small economy
with initially a comparative advantage in the production of agricultural commodities. To
explore the nature of these forces, we use a three-sector inter-temporal general equilibrium
model, with two final goods and one intermediate, non-tradable good. Our model identifies
three main ingredients for a successful process of structural transformation. The first is the
substitutability between physical capital and unskilled labour as inputs into farming. The
second is a capital-augmenting process of technical change in farming induced by greater
availability of agricultural research and extension services. The third is trade openness itself,
which, in the long-run, leads to an increase in the relative supply of skilled labour. Structural
transformation of an agriculture-based economy therefore involves the development of a skill-
intensive extension services sector that induces the transformation of the farming sector, by
reducing the importance of unskilled labour in farming. Without this reduction in the
relative importance of unskilled labour in farming, trade openness will fail to act as an
engine of structural transformation, because it will induce a decline in the return to skill
investment. This in turn, will cause skill-scarcity to persist, thus impeding the development
of the agricultural extension services sector, responsible for raising on-farm productivity
(Evenson and Mwabu, 1998; Owens et al. 2003).
Previous studies imply that this increase in the relative proportion of skilled individuals
fails to benefit the export sector, which they model as unskilled-labour intensive (e.g. Car-
tiglia 1997). Our model reverses this prediction by modelling the farming sector explicitly
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and accounting for the complementarity between farming and extension services (intensive
in skills). This ensures that the export sector (i.e., the farming sector) directly benefits
from the trade-induced increase in the supply of skilled labour. The latter strengthens its
international competitiveness.
References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Patterns of Skill Premia”, Review of Economic Studies 70: 199-230.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron (2002). “Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market”, Journal of Economic
Literature XL: 7-72.
[3] Arbache, Jorge Saba, Andy Dickerson, and Francis Green (2004). “Trade Liberalisation and Wages in
Developing Countries”, The Economic Journal 114: F73-F96.
[4] Cartiglia, Filippo (1997). “Credit Constraints and Human Capital Accumulation in the Open Econ-
omy”, Journal of International Economics 43: 221-236.
[5] Coulter, Jonathan, Andrew Goodland, Anne Tallontire and Rachel Stringfellow (1996). “Marrying
Farmer Co-operation and Contract Farming for Agricultural Service Provision in Sub-Saharan Africa”,
Africa Rural and Urban Studies 3(3).
[6] Desjounqueres, Thibaut, Steve Machin and John Van Reenen, (1999). “Another Nail in the Coffin? Or
Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures Be Resurrected”, Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 101(4), pp 533-54.
[7] Eichers, Theo S. (1999). “Trade, Development and Converging Growth Rates: Dynamic Gains from
Trade Reconsidered”, Journal of International Economics 48: 179-198.
[8] Evenson, Robert E. and Germano Mwabu (1998). “The Effects of Agricultural Extension Services on
Farm Yields in Kenya”, Center Discussion Paper No. 798. Economic Growth Center, Yale University,
New-Haven, Connecticut.
[9] Evenson, Robert E., Carl E. Pray and Mark W. Rosegrant (1999). Agricultural Research and Produc-
tivity Growth in India, IFPRI, Washington D.C.
[10] Findlay, Ronald and Henryk Kierzkowski, (1983). “International Trade and Human Capital: A Simple
General Equilibrium Model”, Journal of Political Economy 91(6): 957-78.
[11] Greenwood, Jeremy and Ananth Seshadri (May 2002). “The U.S. Demographic Transition,” American
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 92( 2): 153-159.
[12] Ingco, Merlinda D. (1996). “Progress in Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Welfare of Least-
Developed Countries”. Working Paper. International Trade Division, The World Bank, Washington
D.C.
[13] Krueger, Anne O. (1996). “Review of: Export Restraint and the New Protectionism: The Political
Economy of Discriminatory Trade Restrictions”, Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (1): 142-44.
[14] Krusell, Per, Lee E. Ohanian, Jose´-Vı´ctor Rı´os-Rull, and Giovanni L. Violante (2000). “Capital-Skill
Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis”. Econometrica 68 (5): 1029-1053.
19
[15] Laitner, John (2000). “Structural Change and Economic Growth”, Review of Economic Studies 67(3):
545-61.
[16] Matsuyama, Kiminori (1990). “Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game”, American Economic
Review 80: 480-92.
[17] Matsuyama, Kiminori (1992). “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic
Growth”. Journal of Economic Theory 58(2): 317-34.
[18] Owens, Trudy, John Hoddinott and Bill Kinsey (2003). “The Impact of Agricultural Extension on Farm
Production in Resettlement Areas of Zimbabwe”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 51(2):
337-58.
[19] Ranjan, Priya (2001). “Dynamic Evolution of Income Distribution and Credit Constrained Human
Capital Investment in Open Economies”, Journal of International Economics 55: 329–358.
[20] Robbins, Donald (1996). “HOS Hits Facts: Facts Win; Evidence on Trade and Wages in the Developing
World”, Harvard University, Development Discussion Paper No. 557.
[21] Schultz, James, Ray Diamond, Claude Freeman, and Thomas Thompson (1996). “Albanian Agricul-
ture Adjustment Project”. Extension Workshop, Alternative Mechanisms for Funding and Delivering
Extension. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
[22] Stokey, Nancy L. (1996). “Trade Openness, Factor Returns, and Factor Accumulation”, Journal of
Economic Growth 1: 421-447.
[23] Temple, Jonathan and Hans-Joachim Voth (1998). “Human Capital, Equipment Investment, and In-
dustrialisation”, European Economic Review 42: 1343-62.
[24] Umali-Deininger, Dina (1996). “New Approaches to an Old Problem: The Public and Private Sector
in Extension”. Extension Workshop, Alternative Mechanisms for Funding and Delivering Extension.
Washington, D.C.:World Bank.
[25] UNCTAD (2004). Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures, New York and Geneva.
[26] UNCTAD (2003). Export Diversification, Market Access and Competitiveness, Trade and Development
Board, Commission on Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities. Seventh session, Geneva, 3–7
February 2003.
[27] World Bank (1997). “Rural Development: From Vision to Action”. Sector Strategy, Environmentally
and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series 12. Washington, D.C.
20
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, using (13) and (21), the following can be obtained as an
implication of the equal rental rates condition:
pm
[
φ (X)Ka + U
X
]1−α
= φ (X)
(
Km
Sm
)1−α
. (31)
Second, using (12) and (15), the following can be obtained as an implication of the equal
skilled-labour wage condition:
px = pm
(
SxKm
Sm
)α
. (32)
Third, combining (32)and (19), rearranging terms yields
φ (X)Ka + U
X
= γ (pm)
1/α
(
Km
Sm
)
Sx, (33)
with
γ =
(
1
1− α
)1/α
. (34)
Finally, from (31), substituting in (33), (14) and (17), using market-clearing conditions and
rearranging terms yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 2. From pit = ωst/ωut, substituting in (12) and (20) yields the steady-state
skill-premium as follows:
pi∗ =
(
1− α
α
)
pm
[
φ (X∗)K∗a + U
∗
X∗
]1−α (
K∗m
S∗m
)α
.
Substituting in (31) and rearranging terms yields
pi∗ =
1− α
α
φ(X∗)
(
K∗m
S∗m
)
. (35)
Next, consider (33) above. Since K∗a = K−K
∗
m as an implication of the physical capital’s
resource constraint, substituting this expression in (33), rearranging terms yields
φ (X∗)K∗a + U
∗
X∗
=
[
γ (pm)
1/α X
∗Sx
φ(X∗)
+ S∗m
] (
K∗m
S∗m
)
which implies that
K∗m
S∗m
=
φ (X∗)K∗a + U
∗
X∗
[
γ (pm)
1/α X
∗Sx
φ(X∗)
+ S∗m
]
−1
. (36)
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Now, from (35), substituting in (36) rearranging terms yields
pi∗ =
1− α
α
[
[φ(X∗)K + U∗]
γ (pm)
1/α [φ(X∗)]−1X∗Sx + S∗m
]
.
Substituting in (17), and (24), using market-clearing conditions and rearranging terms yields
pi∗ =
1− α
α

(pm)δ−δ¯ A¯(1−α)εK + 2 (pm)δ (1− n∗)(
γA¯(1−α)(1−ε) − 1
)
A¯+ (pm)
δ n∗

 ,
where A¯ = (1− α)(1−α)δ and δ¯ = δε (1− α). Using (25) and (34), it can be shown that
(
γA¯(1−α)(1−ε) − 1
)
A¯ =
(
α
1− α
)
(1− α)δ(1−α) .
Therefore, for appropriately chosen α ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 1), it can be argued that
(
γA¯(1−α)(1−ε) − 1
)
A¯→ 0
so that
pi∗ =
λ
n∗
[
(pm)
−δ¯ K + (1− n∗) ν
]
,
where
λ =
1− α
α
A¯(1−α)ε
ν = 2A¯−(1−α)ε.
This completes the proof.
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